5. Stingy in concessions

At the outset we must realize that the Soviets, because of their system, have two built-in negotiating advantages in dealing with the United States:

1. More information. Because of the closed nature of their society, contrasted with our freedom, they always start out knowing more about our real needs, priorities, and deadlines than we know about theirs. Their representatives and agents watch our media, read our newspapers, and even subscribe to our scientific publications. Essentially what we know about them is what the Politburo wants to tell us.
2. More time. In the main, very little turnover occurs in the top-echelon Kremlin leadership. Whether it’s Khrushchev, Brezhnev, or Gromyko, their tenure seems endless. By contrast, the United States has regular leadership changes due to shorter political cycles. Further compounding our inability to use time effectively, are the incessant popularity polls and the dynamic nature of our society, which causes personnel changes and a compelling need to produce quick tangible results.

As Secretary of State Dean Acheson said more than thirty years ago, “The business of dealing with the Russians is a long, long job.” The nature of their system, with its state-controlled media and absence of accountability, givens them the luxury of patience.

With this advantage they can establish longer time frames to get what they want. During this period they attempt to wear us down through endless delays, issuing constant “nyets” and making meager concessions, separated by long intervals.

To most Americans, “Time is money,” and this attitude has conditioned us to observe and respect schedules and deadlines. As a correlative to this attitude, we have been taught to revere efficiency, which means we prefer meetings and negotiations that are crisp and brief.

More than one hundred years ago Alexis de Tocqueville said of the American character: “There is a tendency to abandon mature design to gratify a momentary passion.”

One of the most decisive determinants in the outcome of any negotiation is the size and number of concessions made by one side compared to those of its adversary. Slick Soviet-style negotiators, wherever reared, will always try to induce you to make the first concession. Thereafter, they will try to avoid any reciprocation. When you yield something to them, what you receive in return will be of lesser value by comparision. By practicing forebearance, competitive negotiators strive to see that the size and number of times you concede is greater than theirs.