CHAPTER 7
Failures, Errors, and Value Traps

“Some things happen for a reason. Others just come with the season.”

—Ana Claudia Antunes

I have spent many pages detailing the reasons why we should buy only good companies. With a good company, time is on your side. If you can buy at an attractive price, you will achieve great returns. If you can buy at a fair price, you grow with the company and will still do well. If you pay a high price, over time the growth of the business value will compensate for the initial cost. Although your return will be subpar, you will still be able to someday get your money back.

With a company that is eroding value, the risk you face is the permanent loss of capital. This is why I would rather buy the right company and pay a little more than buy the wrong company on the cheap.

There are many ways to lose money in the stock market. Beginning investors lose money on hot stocks and speculation. Growth investors expect speculative growth to endure and pay too much for it. Value investors are addicted to price bargains and overlook the quality of the underlying business.

The stock market is just weird. Every time someone sells, someone else buys, and they both think they're smart!

The Wrong Companies

You can easily lose a lot of money in the stock market by buying when the market is exciting and optimistic, then selling when it is distressed and in a panic. Or by playing with stock options and futures or by buying on margins—if you do, you can lose money with almost any stock. Even if you are a long-term investor in a relatively peaceful bull market, you can still lose money by buying the wrong companies—ones that are on their way to failing or that may survive but will never reach a point to justify the price you paid.

Next, I summarize the signs that may indicate you are buying a wrong company. These warning signs are different from what I described in the previous chapter. The warning signs that follow are focused on the business behaviors of a company. If you recognize any of these signs related to the company's business operation, you may want to avoid buying at any price.

It Has a Hot Product with a Bright Future

These are usually young companies in hot industries. Their products are typically involved in revolutionary technology that is disruptive and can have enormous impact on society. Many ambitious young entrepreneurs start companies within the field because the technology is promising; it changes people's lives, so investors are excited about its bright prospects and buy into the future of the technology.

As the technology matures, it becomes evident that it did change people's lives. But the field is too crowded. Few companies will become profitable and survive. Those that do can create immense wealth for their investors, whereas most other investors lose money because their companies cannot turn a profit. Many more may never have any meaningful revenue.

Beginning and amateur investors can easily get into this situation, like I did when I started out. I bought into fiber optics because the technology was so promising and suggested the brightest future. The technology did dramatically increase the speed of the Internet and made possible many applications, like video streaming, mobile Internet, and online gaming, but the surfeit of companies just couldn't generate a profit and could never justify their past valuation.

This happens once every few years in new fields, and it occurs more frequently now than in the past due to the acceleration of technology and innovations. In the past century, it was the flight industry, the automobile industry, semiconductors, digital watches, computer hardware, software, the Internet, dot-coms, and fiber optics. For this century, it has so far been solar technology, biotech, social media, electric cars, and so on.

Starting in the mid-2000s, with the support and incentives of governments from the United States to China, solar technology was booming. The technology was promising because it is clean and cannot be depleted, and we seem to be running out of oil and gas. The advance of technology has lowered the cost to more economically viable levels. It is revolutionary. Even Thomas Edison once said: “I'd put my money on the sun and solar energy. What a source of power! I hope we don't have to wait until oil and coal run out before we tackle that.”

Hundreds of solar-panel companies popped up worldwide, many of them publicly traded, and it seemed to be a wonderful opportunity for investors to participate in the booming new technology. Investors bid up the stock prices and created new wealth. Shi Zhengrong, the founder of Chinese solar company Suntech Power Holdings, became China's richest person at the time, with a net worth of more than $2 billion as Suntech was traded on the NYSE with a market cap of $12 billion. U.S. solar companies SunEdison, First Solar, and SunPower Corp. were all traded at above $10 billion in market cap.

But the competition is brutal, and it is also global. As with any new technology, new investments poured in, adding more to the competition; the technology then advanced quickly, and the crowded field produced much more capacity than the market can digest. The price of solar panels collapsed. There is no winner. Suntech Power and SunEdison are now bankrupt. First Solar and SunPower both lost more than 80 percent of their market values from 2008. SunPower is still losing money. SolarCity, a relatively new player that lays solar panel on people's roofs and has visionary entrepreneur Elon Musk as its chairman and largest shareholder, cannot make it alone and has merged into another of Musk's companies, Tesla Motors. Tesla has its own problems. It has never made a profit, either, and its losses are mounting. It is also in a similarly hot field that more players are entering. It is now rumored that even Apple is planning to make cars. It feels just like the fiber optics bubble I so painfully experienced.

Don't get me wrong. Solar energy did have a bright future. It still has. It is becoming more cost-effective and its market share has increased. As a former scientist and inventor, I am not against new technology and innovations. New technology and innovations improve people's lives. They just don't make good investments.

It Has a Hot Product that Everyone Is Buying

Remember the days when almost every child wore a pair of Crocs? Or every teenager wore an Aeropostale T-shirt? They were cool and kids loved them. Crocs' sales tripled in 2006 from the year before, then more than doubled in 2007. Aeropostale's sales grew more than 20 percent every year from 2004 through 2009. While the kids' parents bought the shoes and the T-shirts, they bought the stocks, too. Crocs' stocks were traded at a market cap of more than $6 billion. Aeropostale was traded at close to $3 billion.

But those shoes are now ugly, and no one wants to wear a T-shirt with AERO emblazoned across the front. Crocs was able to diversify its products into additional areas and is selling more shoes than before. But its stock has lost more than 80 percent and is traded at less than $1 billion in market cap. Aeropostale just cannot get back its cool and has filed for bankruptcy.

It is acceptable to buy the stocks if you love the companies' products, but make sure growth is sustainable and the company is profitable. This is why we select only companies that have been profitable for at least ten years to qualify as a good company. The concept must be proven for at least a full market cycle; we don't want to get caught up in a fad.

It Is at the Peak of the Cycle

The earnings are good and its stock valuation looks low. But it is actually a cyclical business that is at its peak. Cyclicals like automakers, airlines, and durable goods producers have good earnings at the peak of the cycle, which makes their P/E low and the stock attractive. P/S and P/B ratios relative to their historical range are better indicators of where they are with valuation. If the company produces commodities like oil, coal, steel, gold, and so forth, it is also necessary to consider where the prices of the commodities are relative to their historical range. When they are at the high end of the historical range, they are likely to go lower. I will explain more about investing in cyclical companies in Chapter 9.

We have heard a lot of turnaround stories with cyclicals. But usually it is not because the management has special skills, but instead simply because their market comes back. If recession hits again, the management will probably discover that “we succeeded in turning around the business … just in the wrong direction.”

We want to avoid cyclicals, but if you are determined to buy, the best time is when cyclicals are at the bottom of the cycle, when the news is bad, and they may be losing money. Many of them cannot make it through and in turn go bankrupt. Buy those with the solidest financial strength and that are able to make it through the bad times. Also, remember to sell them when things look good and they are again generating large profit. Unlike the consistently profitable companies, cyclicals will again fall into trouble when the industry gets into a down cycle.

It Is Growing Fast

You want the company you buy to grow, but you don't want it to grow too fast. If a company grows too quickly, it may not be able to hire enough qualified employees to maintain quality of products and customer service. This is what happened to Krispy Kreme in the early 2000s and Starbucks in the mid-2000s. Starbucks had to close more than 900 unprofitable locations and focus on its core business.

Furthermore, such companies may need more capital than they can generate to fund the fast growth, causing a cash crunch and forcing them to borrow. If there is any hiccup in the economy or the business itself, they may not be able to service their debt and could face bankruptcy risk.

Tesla is growing fast, with its Model 3 wait time said to be three years. The company is spending heavily to ramp up its manufacturing capacity. In the meantime, as it sells more cars, it loses more money. Tesla's stock has done well for those who bought before 2013, so far. And remember, it just bought SolarCity, which was also a fast grower facing an even worse cash-flow problem. With Tesla's mounting loss and debt, and a merger with a company that was in worse shape, I will stay away from it.

Growing too fast is dangerous. When a company is growing fast, watch its cash.

It Is an Aggressive Serial Acquirer

Companies can also grow through acquisition, which is even more dangerous. I can find far more examples of companies that get into trouble by acquiring others. Driven by ambitious CEOs, many companies grow by acquiring their competitors. They pay a high price for the acquisition and get themselves deep into debt. This was what happened with Canadian drugmaker Valeant. After Michael Pearson became its CEO in 2010, the company went on a shopping spree. Through multiple acquisitions every year, its revenue grew from less than $1 billion in 2009 to more than $10 billion in 2015. For quite a while, Valeant was the hottest stock from the United States to Canada. Investors cheered the growth by driving its stock up more than 20 times. Pearson was considered capable and was the highest-paid CEO in the world. In the meantime, the company's long-term debt ballooned from $380 million to $30 billion. Then its luck ran out and the company found itself under SEC investigation. Its acquisition growth model collapsed and Pearson was ousted. The stock has lost 85 percent from its peak, with Valeant still losing money and the debt bomb ticking.

If a company is too aggressive with acquisition, watch its debt.

Its Business Is Too Competitive

No business is immune to competition, which is why a business must build an economic moat with high quality, low cost, brand recognition, high switching cost through network effect, and so on. Different businesses compete in different ways and at different scales. A restaurant mainly competes with other restaurants in the same area. A technology company's competition can come from anywhere on the globe.

If a company sells commodity products, it cannot differentiate itself through products. It has to compete via prices. The ones with the lowest cost win. Commodity products include oil, gas, agricultural products, airline tickets, and insurance. Over time, many high-tech products become commodities, too. Think TVs and computers. Now even smartphones are becoming commodities.

Retail is an especially tough business because almost everything a store sells can be found somewhere else, and everything it does can be easily imitated by its competitors. Retail stores' competition used to be local, but now is global and online. Those with higher costs cannot survive, and we have seen many closed. Still remember Circuit City, Sport Authority, and K-Mart? Department-store business is among the most competitive; somehow there are always too many of them. In 1977, Warren Buffett lost money on a department store called Vornado Inc. He wrote: “It turned out that the industry was over-stored, and Vornado and the rest of the discounters were getting killed by competition from K-Mart stores.”1 Even K-Mart is long gone, and the industry is just as overstored as it was 40 years ago.

The shift of consumers to online shopping makes the department-store business even worse. We will continue to see the struggle of the likes of JC Penney, Macy's, Sears, and so on. In an industry that competes at such fierce intensity, no one wins.

It Does Everything to Gain Market Share

It is not always good for a business to have more customers. A business needs to be selective with customers and price its products at a level that is competitive but profitable. Attention should be focused on the customers who are loyal and profitable. Trying to gain market share through aggressive pricing puts a business's survivability in danger.

Doing everything to gain market share can be fatal to financial institutions like banks and insurance. The adverse effect usually doesn't show up until several years later, which is why they need a strict underwriting process to qualify customers and price the potential loss properly. It wasn't long ago that banks relaxed their underwriting standards and gave loans to subprime borrowers who would otherwise not qualify. They got into price wars with loans that offered “zero down, zero percent, and zero payment.” The financial crisis caused by subprime loans eventually drove the world's financial system to the brink of collapse. The banks that had the most exposure were punished most heavily, too. Many of them are gone and forgotten.

Insurance companies can get into deep trouble if they take on too many customers without pricing the risk properly. In the early 1970s, GEICO almost destroyed itself because it wanted to gain more market share. It charged too little for its car-insurance policies. The company was on the verge of bankruptcy before increasing prices and getting out of the states where it was unprofitable. By doing that, it lost market share but became profitable again. When I bought my first house in 2000, I insured it through an insurer called Texas Select. The insurance premium was considerably lower than other insurers for the same coverage. But in 2006, the company went bankrupt, and I had to switch to another insurer at a higher premium. Texas Select's low rate may have worked on a very small group of well-qualified customers, but being too aggressive with pricing drove the insurance company out of business.

In his 2004 shareholder letter, Buffett called Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary National Indemnity Company a “disciplined underwriter” because from 1986 through 1999 the company would not match its “most optimistic competitor” on pricing and was willing to lose customers to maintain its underwriting profitability.2

If a company tries to gain customers without watching its bottom line, stay away.

It Faces Regulatory Landscape Shifts

For many years, for-profit education was a lucrative business, as it provided career training and college-level education to people who would otherwise not qualify for accredited colleges and universities. Revenue and profit were soaring for decades, and for-profit educators' stocks were among the best performers during the first decade of this century. But suddenly everything came to a stop. Their students could not find jobs and were deep in debt with student loans. And the government, having provided billions in financial aid, is on the hook for the loss with student loans. For-profit education companies are under investigation by the government, and new laws were established that would greatly limit their capability of enrolling new students. The industry collapsed and shareholders lost big.

Be sure to consider the regulatory risk with the companies in which you invest. After the financial crisis in 2008, new laws were enacted to regulate the banking industry. Many revenue sources disappeared. Hospitals and healthcare insurers have had to do business differently after Obamacare became law. These are the risks involved in investing in regulated industries.

It Becomes Aged

A company being aged does not necessarily mean that it is in business for too many years. It means that the company cannot adapt to the shift of the industry dynamics; its products have lost their appeal and are replaced by new technologies. Newspapers, once dominant news providers and advertisers in the areas they serve, are now being displaced by the Internet. Blockbuster, the brick-and-mortar store that rented video DVDs, was replaced by Netflix. Kodak's film was replaced by digital cameras. And retail stores have been replaced by online shopping.

Canadian smartphone maker BlackBerry once dominated the corporate world and had more than 50 percent of the smartphone market share. Every executive in the corporate world had a BlackBerry. Even I used two BlackBerry phones. But the company was too slow to adapt to touchscreen phones, and it never built an ecosystem that would increase the switching cost for customers. I remember the days when I could never memorize the combination of keys on BlackBerry to delete blocks of emails. Now BlackBerry is a forgotten player in the smartphone market.

The problem with these aged companies is that they do own a lot of assets: real estate, patents, brands, business subsidiaries, and so on, and those can look attractive to value investors after the stock has declined by a large percentage. But often they are value traps, and this is where value investors lose most of their money. I will discuss value traps in greater detail in the next section of this chapter.

images

If the warning signs in the previous chapter are the symptoms of the disease, the behaviors discussed in this section are the internal problems that cause the disease. A company that displays the warning signs of the last chapter is not necessarily sick. You can still buy these companies if you understand the reason behind the signs and take these into consideration for purchase price. But if a company is displaying the behavior that I just described, it should be altogether avoided.

The tricky part is that these companies don't necessarily fail quickly. Although they are actually “dead companies walking,” as termed by hedge fund manager Scott Fearon in his excellent book that carries the same name,3 they can continue to exist for years, especially when the market is booming and funding is easy to find. They can be enticing to those who look for price bargains. But, as Peter Lynch said, “Just because a company is doing poorly doesn't mean it can't do worse.”4 With these companies, things can get much worse.

Value Traps

An experienced value investor can recognize most of the bad business behaviors described in the last section. But unfortunately for value investors, a price bargain is often so attractive that it blinds them from looking at the long-term prospect of the business value. This price bargain can be a value trap in which the business keeps eroding value. Value investors lose far more money by falling into value traps than by paying too much to buy stocks. Even some of the best value investors can tumble into value traps. Berkshire Hathaway was a value trap at the time of Buffett's purchase, which eventually cost him and his partners $100 billion.5 Sears, as I discussed extensively in Chapter 2, is a value trap that cost Bruce Berkowitz and his Fairholme Fund shareholders many years of outperformance.

In value traps, the stock price does usually look cheap relative to the earnings, cash flow, and especially the assets of the company. These assets can be real estate, patents, the brands, the collections, or the businesses the company owns. But the company has lost its competitive advantage and is on the path of permanent decline in its earnings power. It may seem that even if the company does not earn any money, its stock price is still a bargain relative to the assets it owns. But in reality, there is rarely a catalyst that can force the company into a quick liquidation. The first choice for management is always to turn the business around. The process can drag on for years, and in the meantime, the value of the business continues to decline. Even if it enters a fire sale, the assets can rarely fetch prices close to their worth, and the liquidation cost can also eat into a large percentage of the proceeds.

I commented on BlackBerry in the previous section. The involvement in BlackBerry by large value investment firms Primecap Management and Fairfax Financial in the past several years is a typical case of value investors falling into a value trap. Both investment firms have been in business for decades and have built enviable track records. Neither of them bought BlackBerry during its fast-growth stage when its stock was traded at high valuations. The stock reached its peak at close to $150 per share or $80 billion in market cap in 2008. These firms started to buy in 2010 after the stock lost about half from its peak and looked cheap. But the stock price kept slipping and both firms kept adding to their shares. By 2012, the stock was traded below $17 and looked even cheaper relative to the company's assets. The rationale behind the investment is that the company had valuable assets and a sizable business that included:

In 2013, BlackBerry hired Thorsten Heins as new CEO to turn the business around. It didn't work out. In less than a year it hired John Chen to replace Heins. The Caltech-trained Chen had an impressive resume of running technology companies.7 But since he joined, BlackBerry has declined from “revenues of approximately $8 billion with cash of $2.6 billion and no debt” to “revenues of less than $1.5 billion with cash of $1.2 billion and debt of $600 million.” Its tangible book value per share has shrunk from $12.5 in February 2012 to $1.72 as of November 2016. The company has been losing money every year of the last four.8 The stock is now traded at $7. If measured by price/tangible-book-value, the stock is now more expensive at $7 than it was at $17 in 2012.

One may argue that BlackBerry's 4,000-plus patent portfolio alone is worth more than its current book value of $1.72 per share. This might be true. When Apple and Microsoft bought the patents of defunct Nortel in 2011, or Google purchased Motorola Mobility for its patents in 2013, they paid over $7,000 for each patent. But patents are hard to value. When I was still a scientist with my former employer, our legal counsel told me that during patent lawsuits both sides print their patents and bring the printouts to court to compare the height of their stacks of patents. The company with the higher stack wins the suit. It simply costs too much to get into the details of patent claims. And, oh boy, reading patent documents is the most boring work in the world. For the Nortel patents, Google initially wanted to pay just $1,500 per patent. As time progresses, many of the patents will reach their 20-year protection lifetime and become worthless. Talk about the erosion of value!

The key to identifying a value trap is to check if the company's competitive advantage still exists and if the company can still grow its value. Once the business loses its competitive advantage and is on the decline, its assets also lose their earnings power and will be worth far less. Investors should always ask themselves these questions: Can the business still make money in the way it once did? Are there competitors that now do what the company does but better? Can competitors make money by offering similar products and services at lower prices?

Weight Watchers is another example of a costly value trap. The stock was traded at above $80 in 2011 and the market cap was above $5 billion. Internet, free mobile, and other weight-management apps and electronic weight-management approaches competed for Weight Watchers' business at a much lower cost. The company has experienced a long-term trend of shrinking profit margins. Investors who paid attention to its profit margins had plenty of opportunities to get out of the stock. Today the stock is traded at just above $10.

Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos famously said that “your margin is my opportunity.”9 If a business cannot build an economic moat to protect its profitability, its profit margins are destined to shrink due to competition.

The decline of value traps can happen in four stages:

  1. Stage 1. Gross margin and operating margin decline. If a company loses its competitive advantage, its margins usually decline first. At this stage, its revenue and profit may continue to increase, which may mask the company's problem. This is where Weight Watchers was during the years 2000 through 2006.
  2. Stage 2. As revenue growth slows, earnings stop growing. This is where Weight Watchers was from 2006 through 2012.
  3. Stage 3. As revenue growth slows further, earnings start to decline. This is where Weight Watchers was from 2012 through 2013.
  4. Stage 4. Both revenue and earnings decline. This is where Weight Watchers has been since 2013.

For fast-changing industries like smartphones, the declines happen much faster and each stage is shorter than it was for Weight Watchers. The worst loss to stock prices happens when the company's margins and earnings are on the decline and the company is on its way to losing money. The stock may look cheap, but an investor who worries more about the competitiveness of the business than the price bargain will not get into this kind of situation. In October 2015, it was reported that Oprah Winfrey bought 10 percent of Weight Watchers; the stock jumped 300 percent on the news. Oprah is now advertising for the company and sharing her own experience with the company's weight-loss program. But the key is if her fans will follow her and become paying members, which is yet to be seen. Weight Watchers' competitors still cost far less, and that fact cannot be changed by Oprah. Even a good captain cannot save a sinking ship, never mind a celebrity.

Many of the value traps eventually fail completely. Some may be able to reinvent themselves and change their product focus and stabilize at lower levels. The latter case might be seen as a turnaround and the stocks may recover slightly, but they can rarely regain their past glory. In either case, the loss to those who buy them for the price bargain during the decline is permanent.

Options, Margins, and Shorts

At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested playing with stock options, buying on margins, and shorting stocks as sure ways to lose money. If you buy the stock of a good company, time is on your side. But the same cannot be said for the stock options of the same company. With stock options, you are predicting the movement of the stock prices of the company for certain time periods. Even if you are right about the direction of the company's value, the stock price can move against you and you can lose it all.

Buying on margin has a similar effect. Your gain and loss are amplified by the margin. During an extreme market swing, you may lose it all, even if your opinion on the company is correct.

When you short stocks, your maximum gain is 100 percent, while your maximum loss is infinite. Though many companies die and their stocks move to zero, very few people can make money shorting stocks for a prolonged duration because over the long term the economy and business grow and the stock market has a bias for moving higher. Maybe you are right that the company is in trouble and could one day go into bankruptcy, but it can take a long time for its stock to go down. Few executives want to see their stocks go down. They may use techniques such as share buybacks and dividend raises to drive up the stock price. In stock market bubbles, even a company that keeps losing money can see its stock going up and up. In the meantime, you have to pay the borrowing cost and pay back the dividends to those you borrow the shares from. Remember what John Keynes said: “Markets can remain irrational a lot longer than you can remain solvent.” You want to avoid situations in which time works against you and you face the possibility of permanent loss.

The only time you should consider using options is probably selling put options on the stock you intend to buy and for which you hope to reduce the share cost. A put option is a contract in which the option seller, who collects the option premium, is obligated to buy the stock at the exercise price (strike price) before the expiration of the contract. If at the time of exercise, the stock is traded lower than the strike price, the put seller is paying a higher price than the market price. If instead the stock is traded higher than the strike price, the put buyer (owner) will not exercise the option and the contract will expire worthless. Buffett sold put options to lower his purchase cost when he wanted to buy Coca-Cola stocks in 1993 and Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) stocks in 2008.

We can look at the details of Buffett's put transactions on BNSF to understand how to lower the share cost when buying stocks by selling puts, as shown in the table below.

All the put options that Buffett sold on BNSF are short term—about two months. For the transaction on 10/6/2008, the stock was traded at $84.98 per share. Buffett could have bought the stock outright at that price. But instead he sold put options with the strike price of $80 and the expiration date in two months for $7.02 per share. By the expiration of the put options on 12/8/2008, the stock was traded at $76.55. Buffett had to buy the stock at $80. But his real cost per share is $72.98, which is equal to the strike price minus the option price. So, Buffett reduced his share cost by $12 by selling puts instead of buying the stock outright on the day of the option transaction. Buffett continued to do this in multiple transactions until December 2008 and bought 7.8 million shares of BNSF along the way, saving $75 million for Berkshire Hathaway on those shares, which is a significant 13.7 percent of the total cost.

Transaction Date Market Price ($) Strike Price ($) Shares Sold Date Exercisable Option Price ($) Share Cost After Option Exercised Price on Date of Exercise ($) Money Saved per Share ($) Total Saved Relative to Buying Stocks on Traction Date ($)
10/6/2008 84.98 80 1,309,524 12/8/2008 7.02 72.98 76.55 12 15,714,288
10/8/2008 81.44 80 1,190,476 12/9/2008 7.03 72.97 75.2 8.47 10,083,332
10/8/2008 81.44 77 761,111 12/9/2008 5.78 71.22 75.2 10.22 7,778,554
10/10/2008 80.16 75 1,217,500 12/12/2008 7.09 67.91 74.68 12.25 14,914,375
10/16/2008 80.47 76 1,000,000 12/19/2008 6.2 69.8 74.68 10.67 10,670,000
12/3/2008 75.5 75 2,325,000 1/30/2009 6.35 68.65 66.25 6.85 15,926,250
Total Saved: 75,086,799

Of course, there is no free lunch. This case worked in Buffett's favor because during the months after he sold the put options, BNSF stock went down. If it had gone up instead, Buffett would not have gotten the shares. He would have simply pocketed the $51 million in option premiums. But those shares would have eventually cost $105 million more when Berkshire Hathaway acquired BNSF at $100 per share in February 2010. Therefore, there is always a chance that you will not get to buy the stock at the price on the option transaction date, and you will lose the investment opportunity if you don't want to pay a higher price.

Another reason selling BNSF options worked well for Buffett was timing. Although Buffett said he doesn't time the market, he sure knows when to sell options. The third quarter of 2008 through the first quarter of 2009 was the most volatile time for the stock market in more than three decades except Black Monday in 1987. When volatility is high, option premium is high. Two-month put options with a strike price 5 percent lower than the stock price carried a premium of close to 9 percent. Today, similar put options can only fetch a premium of around 1 percent.

When selling put options, you always have the possibility to buy the stocks when the contract expires. Therefore, you must make sure that you only sell put options on the stocks you want to own for the long term, and that you have the cash to buy the stock. If the stock prices go lower than the strike price, you will get the shares. If you love the option premium but hate the stock, you will get yourself into big trouble. I personally know someone who sold puts on Nortel stocks. She got to pocket the option premium but was forced to buy the Nortel shares, which eventually went to zero!

In summary, selling put options can be an effective way to reduce the share cost. But do remember:

  • Work with short-term put options.
  • It works well when market volatility is high.
  • Do so only with the companies you want to buy and that you have the cash to buy.
  • You may lose the investment opportunity altogether if the stock price goes up.

Otherwise, stay away from options, margins, and shorts.

images

If I made buying good companies sound simple in Chapters 3 and 4, I have probably made it sound too complex in the preceding and current chapters. Of course, it is not simple. Charlie Munger said that anyone who considers it simple is stupid. But we can look for situations that are relatively simple, a company with a business that is easy to understand, and an industry that changes relatively slowly and has a minimal regulatory risk. Buffett said that in investing, you don't get rewarded more by working on difficult moves like in gymnastics. He uses three jars—“yes,” “no,” and “too-hard”—when he looks at each investment opportunity. Most of the ideas belong in the too-hard jar.

If it still sounds too hard, don't get discouraged. You can participate in the long-term prosperity of good business and achieve satisfactory returns by investing in a basket of great companies. And it is really simple.

Notes